Fenix: Add setting to Trigger Authentication before Autofill

[s-ankur]

What is the user problem or growth opportunity you want to see solved?

Saved logins has biometric authentication for viewing all logins. But you can fill in the logins without any sort of authentication. If you want to have authentication then it should be there for all entry points. Otherwise there is no use for it

How do you know that this problem exists today? Why is this important?

People can easily log in using my credentials if if leave my browser open. Granted this is an unlikely scenario but the current feature ( #5547) gives an undue impression of security when that is not the case

Who will benefit from it?

Anyone who stores passwords in firefox password manager (securely)/people who were asking for a master password . Also users who are aware of bitwarden and other password managers which ask for authentication before autofill

[cadeyrn]

People can easily log in using my credentials if if leave my browser open.

Why do people this? I would argue that if you really leave your smartphone unattended and without any authentication then you have much bigger problems than the access to Firefox data. 😉

But back to your request: There were already a few reports for a master password in the last past days. These issues were closed as "already implemented" since the _direct access_ too the logins is already protected in the settings. I guess what these people really meant was exactly what you explain in your request. But it was not explained well in the other issues. The master password is only a tool and doesn't need to be re-implemted. The same authentication method that is already used in the settings could be used here as well. I agree with your proposal that it makes sense to expand the protection for all entry points.

[s-ankur]

The current protection is more or less an inconvenience than a feature. Without authentication for all entry points, it will not provide security, just security theatre. As you note, the security it could in theory provide really overshadows bigger problems ( unless people are using the "delete browsing data on quit" feature.)

I think this is should be taken as a bug in the current protection rather than an entire new feature request

[liuche]

We did consider this originally, but left it off of v1 of logins because it seemed too onerous for the everyday user. Could add a setting for it though.

[madb1lly]

Hi all,
This is no more onerous than having to enter my master password every time I open Firefox on Desktop for the first time. I'm dubious of the real security utility which that provides, but it does at least provide some.
Cheers 🙂

[s-ankur]

Just to reiterate, my issue is not with having more security but actually completing the security that you have right now via #5547

The protection introduced by https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix/issues/5547 can be easily circumvented currently:

Suppose you save a login for google.com
The authentication in saved logins will prevent anyone from seeing that login via settings
But you can easily use that login by directly going to google.com and clicking on suggested logins (which are unprotected)

This issue addresses this security loophole. Do correct me if I am wrong, but If this loophole is not addressed then there is no point to having #5547. Onerous or not, if you have #5547 then you need to have this feature as well.

[s-ankur]

You don't have to authenticate for each autofill btw. Just copy bitwarden behaviour and authenticate after a timeout or app session