None of the above.
KeePassXC - Version 2.3.4
Revision: 6fe821c
Libraries:
Operating system: Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS
CPU architecture: x86_64
Kernel: linux 4.15.0-34-generic
Enabled extensions:
When the application associated with an opened attachment is closed, the temp file should probably be be deleted and when KeePassXC is closed / locked, it should definitely be deleted.
Above all things this should be prioritized. I think the temp file should be deleted in _all_ instances, including after the opened attachment has been closed.
The Open button uses whatever application is associated with the attachment's extension. Are you assuming that all applications will write a single temporary file to a standard location? That all applications will manage memory securely? KeepassXC has an option to clear the clipboard after a certain number of seconds, yet at the same time, you're allowing the user to open a file that they've intentionally safeguarded with, say, an application like Microsoft Word (.rtf) or LibreOffice (.csv)?
This issue is connected with feature request #3383 .
A simple solution might be to remove the "open in place" feature altogether. If the user wants to see the file, he can extract the file where and how he wants using the save button, and open it itself under his full control. The usability of this is not much less than auto-extracting it to /tmp.
The primary purpose of keepassxc is to keep information secure. It's not intuitive that "opening" a file extracts it to /tmp at all in the first place, and furthermore, leaves it there. This allows access to the file for anyone with unprivileged access on the user's file-system level.
The user should see and control what's happening with his file if it leaves the encrypted scope, and the cost of usability is negligible compared to the security that it offers.
I can't believe this is open for more than 1 year. I have 2D PIN Codes for the banks stored as jpg in the keepass file. Original KeePass opens them with an inbuilt viewer, so there is no security loophole as KeePassXC has with copying it to a temp folder.
This is a rather big problem to address, we had many other initiatives to work through first, including code refactors, to better support a fix for this. This will be addressed in 2.6.0.
glad to see it worked on, many related issues, it should have never made it into any version in the first place. Go slowely but safe!
https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/3383
https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/3130
The code path hasn't been touched much since we forked from KeePassX, which was beta at that stage, so I assume it's never really been finished.
Should the user guide be amended until this is fixed? See https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/2529#issuecomment-705784573
Most helpful comment
A simple solution might be to remove the "open in place" feature altogether. If the user wants to see the file, he can extract the file where and how he wants using the
savebutton, and open it itself under his full control. The usability of this is not much less than auto-extracting it to/tmp.The primary purpose of
keepassxcis to keep information secure. It's not intuitive that "opening" a file extracts it to/tmpat all in the first place, and furthermore, leaves it there. This allows access to the file for anyone with unprivileged access on the user's file-system level.The user should see and control what's happening with his file if it leaves the encrypted scope, and the cost of usability is negligible compared to the security that it offers.