Including:
Sub-concerns:
Sounds comprehensive 馃憤 - we should structure the spec to be consistent with the other specs - to have detailed outline of the state, and reference all transactions/events as to how they affect that state.
Sounds like some of this is in https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/pull/1263/files but we should go through it again and make sure every thing is clear
We haven't thought through / categorized "network attack scenarios" yet, I think that would be useful.
Also still to-do in the spec: slashing transactions (MsgUnrevoke).
More reasons to write a precise "slashing security model": #1378, #1440
thanks for posting these links - commented on both
Another note: the Tendermint validator-set-delayed-by-a-block changes need to change the slashing rules, since stake now contributes to voting power a block after it was unbonded/redelegated.
Also tagging https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint/issues/2112 which would need to be implemented by the SDK also if we decide to add it to Tendermint.
Just a couple more items here!
Just a couple more items here!
Well, yes and no. The logic is relatively well specified, but we have little of the attack scenario enumeration, economic cost analysis, and light client-related explanation (successfully lying to a light client should always be a slashable offense).
More work has been done here right @cwgoes? Do you mind updating this issue with the remaining Slashing spec work to be done?
I think we still lack a comprehensive explanation of the incentive design rationale. The original issue's list of requirements are accurate.
I plan to work on this while rectifying staking/slashing code / spec, hopefully next week.
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More reasons to write a precise "slashing security model": #1378, #1440