I'm not sure if this is the ideal place to post this, but I just wanted to give people a heads-up that Mozilla's future "Server Side TLS" guidelines will recommend ECDSA certificates for the Intermediate configuration level. This is one of the most commonly used TLS configurations for servers across the internet.
https://github.com/mozilla/server-side-tls/issues/178
https://github.com/mozilla/server-side-tls/issues/254
https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/
In our research, we found that ECDSA and RSA certificates were equally compatible with the vast majority of clients across the internet, comprising this set of clients:
The reason why we are recommending ECDSA certificates over RSA certificates is that they give IE11 clients on Windows 7 access to ECDHE for key exchange; with RSA they are limited to classic DHE. My apologies if this project already uses ECDSA by default.
Please let me know if you have any questions! Thanks!
thanks. I will think about it.
Awesome, thanks. A lot of projects (such as Caddy) will continue to renew certs with the existing key type, and then switch over new certificates to ECDSA.
Either way, thank you so much for your consideration!
don't know if it is well supported to use ed25519 but using a key type which uses a broken number generator feels wrong for me.
@c33s The baseline requirements do not permit any publicly trusted CA to issue end entity certificates with an ed25519 public key at this time. Only RSA and ECDSA (with a specific set of curves, namely NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521).
don't know if it is well supported to use ed25519 but using a key type which uses a broken number generator feels wrong for me.
@cpu It's unlikely that browsers will support ed25519 (for authentication) in certificates any time soon (see for instance https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/can-should-isrg-submit-a-proposal-to-support-ed25519-ed448-certificates-to-ca-b-forum/85127/5 ), but many browsers and servers do support X25519 and X448 (for key exchange), instead of the NIST curves.
It would be really cool, with two caveats:
in the meantime, we could introduce an --rsa option and shiow a notice/warning if the user does not make an explicit choice for rsa or ecc.
鏀寔ECDSA
implement this immediatley
@Duckfine PRs welcome :)
Most helpful comment
@c33s The baseline requirements do not permit any publicly trusted CA to issue end entity certificates with an ed25519 public key at this time. Only RSA and ECDSA (with a specific set of curves, namely NIST P-256, P-384, or P-521).